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INTRODUCTION  
 
The temptation for government to exploit the monopoly position of central banks 
(CBs) in the issue of currency has all too frequently led to excessive inflation, often 
accompanied with disastrous economic and social consequences.1  The abuse of the 
CB by government to solve fiscal problems has been especially notable in developing 
countries. 2   However, during the past two decades many countries have been 
reforming their CB’s legislation granting greater independence to their CBs from 
direct political influence.3 It has been argued that a greater level of central bank 
independence (CBI) along with an explicit mandate for price stability are essential for 
improving overall macroeconomic performance. 4   The success of the highly 
independent German Bundesbank and Swiss National Banks in maintaining low rates 
of inflation for prolonged periods of time as well as the liberalization of capital flows 
in Europe and elsewhere has no doubt contributed to this tendency.5 
 
But what is CBI?  It refers to the freedom of the CB to conduct monetary policy 
without direct government intervention.6  It also means that the decisions made by the 
CB in the exercise of its functions cannot be reverse or countermanded by any other 
branch of government only in extreme cases.7 By all means a CB would not be 
considered independent if the decisions taken can be overruled.8   
 
                                                
1 Pierre Siklos, ‘Varieties of Central Bank Executive Relationships: International Evidence’ 
2 ibid  
3 Yannick Lucotte, ‘The Influence of Central Bank Independence on Budget Deficits in 
Developing Countries: New Evidence From Panel Data Analysis’ (2009) Universite d’ 
Orleans, CNRS, 2 < 
 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.580.349&rep=rep1&type=pdf > 
accessed 16 July 2017.  
4 ibid 
5 Alex Cukierman, ‘Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control’ (1994) 104 The 
Economic Journal 427, 1437 < https://www/researchgate.net/publication/4889776 > accessed 
3 August 2017. 
6 Peter Howells, ‘Independent Central Banks: Some Theoretical and Empirical Problems?’ 
(2009) Centre for Global Finance Working Paper No. 05/09, 3 < 
http://www.uwe.ac.uk/bbs/research/cgf/ > accessed 1 August 2017.  
7 Alan Blinder, ‘Central Banking in a Democracy’ (1996) Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond, Economic Quarterly Volume 82/4, 9 < 
 https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_quart
erly/1996/fall/pdf/blinder.pdf > accessed 1 August 2017. 
8 ibid 
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Despite the trend in making CBs more independent, there are concerns specifically as 
to the lack of transparency that can be derived as a result of independence.9 This is 
based on the idea that since central bankers seem to be remarkably insulated from 
democratic oversight10 it is vital that CB be subject to governmental and public 
scrutiny11 to ensure that CBs use its delegated authority efficiently and effectively to 
achieve its objective(s) and that there are proper checks and balances in place.12 
 
The level of independence granted in the pursuit of monetary policy differs from 
country to country, taking into account that even the most independent CB does not 
operate in a political vacuum.13  But how can one determine the level of CBI? There 
are several factors that can be taken into consideration to measure the level of CBI; 
hence the focus of this paper. 
 
This paper analyses the level of CBI with a focus on three (3) developing countries in 
the Caribbean (Belize, Barbados and Jamaica) as compared to developed countries 
such as the United Kingdom (UK).  It further concludes that the level of CBI is 
greater in developed countries as compared to developing countries.   
 
Chapter 1 focus on the functions of a CB with particular emphasis on monetary policy 
and price stability as the primary objective of a CB as well as financial stability and 
its regulatory role in the financial system. 
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of CBI, its importance and discusses the different types 
of CBI and its relation with accountability.  
 
                                                
9 Carl Walsh, ‘Central Bank Independence’ (2005) University of California 1< 
 https://people.ucsc.edu/~walshc/MyPapers/cbi_newpalgrave.pdf > accessed 18 July 2017.  
10 Jacqueline Best, ‘Why We Need Better Central Bank Accountability’ (2016) Sheffield 
Political Economy Research Institute < http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2016/07/07/why-we-need-
better-central-bank-accountability/ > accessed 24 July 2017. 
11 Frederic Mishkin, Monetary Policy Strategy (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2007) 
46.  
12 Tonny Lybek, ‘Central Bank Autonomy, Accountability and Governance: Conceptual 
Framework’ (2004) International Monetary Fund, MFD 10 < 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/lybek.pdf > accessed 16 July 2017. 
13 Jakob de Haan and Sylvester Eijffinger ‘The Politics of Central Bank Independence’ (2016) 
De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper 539, 2 < 
https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Working%20paper%20539_tcm46-350814.pdf > accessed 27 
July 2017.  
3 
 
Chapter 3 measures the level of CBI in the selected Caribbean jurisdictions using their 
CB’s Acts.  An analysis is done based on the four (4) legal indicators stipulated in the 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN) index.  
 
Chapter 4 further provides theoretical and empirical evidence illustrating how CBI is 
greater in developed countries than developing countries by looking at the CWN legal 
indicators as well as the actual turnover rate (TOR) of governors at the CB of Belize 
as compared to the Bank of England (BoE). 
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CHAPTER 1: FUNCTIONS OF A CENTRAL BANK 
 
Central Banking has evolved overtime and continues to change however the 
underlying principles of ‘sound’ central banking practice have remained largely the 
same.14 The core functions of modern central banking can be traced back to providing 
a stable means of payment where payments were funded mainly through deposits 
(giro banks) and privately owned banks that issued bank notes. 15  The earliest 
progenitor of CBs was the dominant issuers of banknotes and bankers to the 
government as these worked hand in hand.16 This dominance over note issuance 
resulted from privileges bestowed by governments and usually gave CBs enough 
scale to be the choice for government banking; hence providing a fraction of the 
proceeds gained from issuance as loans back to governments.17  However, the 
National Bank of Denmark, the Bank of France, and the Bank of Italy among others 
were founded in an effort to restore monetary stability and the credibility of banknotes 
after periods of over issuance and collapses of convertibility.18 
Today, almost all CBs act as the government’s banker.19 Most CBs do, but with 
widely ranging degrees of intensity.20 It accepts cash deposits and checks of the 
government and other incomes such as taxes and also provides cash requirements for 
payment of salaries, wages and for their expenditure.21 It also maintains a government 
account and no interest is paid on the cash balance of the government maintained by 
the CB.22 Banknotes and coins is a type of physical means of payment and CBs 
usually have the monopoly of producing them with special status through legislation 
                                                
14 Patrick Downes and Reza Vaez-Zadeh, The Evolving Role of Central Banks (International 
Monetary Fund Publication Services 1991) Forward. 
15 Magnus Georgsson et al., ‘The Modern Central Bank’s Mandate and the Discussion 
Following the Financial Crises’ (2015) Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 8 < 
 http://www.riksbank.se/Documents/Rapporter/POV/2015/2015_1/rap_pov_artikel_2_150325
_eng.pdf > accessed 17 July 2017. 
16 David Archer, ‘Roles and Objectives of Modern Central Banks’ (2009) Bank for 
International Settlements 19 <  http://www.bis.org/publ/othp04_2.pdf > accessed 17 July 
2017. 
17 ibid 
18 ibid 10  
19 ibid 43  
20 ibid 43 
21 Zk Jadoon, ‘What are the Main Functions of Central Bank?’ (2016) Business Study Notes < 
http://www.businessstudynotes.com/others/banking-finance/what-are-the-main-functions-of-
central-bank/ > accessed 27 July 2017. 
22 ibid  
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as the country’s legal tender.23  
Nowadays, CBs are essentially an agency for monetary policy as well as promoting 
financial stability that is more prominent during the times of financial turmoil.24 In 
periods of credit stringency, CB may act as lender of last resort by providing financial 
accommodation to financial institutions to maintain overall financial stability in the 
system.25 The role as lender of last resort has evolved out of its rediscounting function 
during emergency periods.26 The real significance of rediscount function is because it 
increases the elasticity and liquidity of the entire credit structure.27 By providing a 
ready medium for the conversion in cash of certain assets of banks,28 it helps to 
maintain their liquidity and makes it possible to a considerable degree the use of cash 
reserves, since commercial banks can conduct a large volume of business with the 
same reserve and capital.29 
1.1 Monetary Policy and Price Stability 
 
A key role of a CB is to conduct monetary policy to achieve price stability (low and 
stable inflation) to help manage economic fluctuations.30  Price stability is usually the 
dominant monetary policy objective specified in legislation.31 Monetary decision-
making and implementation are essential characteristics of a CB however there are 
differences in each country on aspects of monetary policy market due to the level of 
independence granted to a CB.32  Essentially it is vital for the means of payment of 
both physical and virtual currency to have lasting value overtime in order for the 
general public to have confidence in the system.33  In a fixed exchange rate regime, it 
is important to maintain the value of the domestic currency in relation to foreign 
                                                
23 Georgsson (n 15) 17  
24 ibid 2  
25 Jadoon (n 21)  
26 Smriti Chand, ‘Important Functions Performed by Central Banks: 6 Functions’ (2016) Your 
Article Library < http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/banking/important-functions-performed-
by-central-banks-6-functions/24807/ > accessed 27 July 2017. 
27 ibid 
28 ibid 
29 ibid 
30 ‘Monetary Policy and Central Banking’ (2017) International Monetary Fund < 
http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/20/Monetary-Policy-and-
Central-Banking > accessed 27 July 2017. 
31 Archer (n 16) 2  
32 ibid 32  
33 Georgsson (n 15) 19  
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currencies.34  Whereas in a floating exchange rate regime, CB would commonly steer 
the value of the domestic currency on the basis of a target based on the changes in the 
domestic currency value (demand and supply) in relation to price developments on 
both goods and services sold domestically.35 This regime allows CBs to interpret the 
price developments for goods and services sold thereby setting the interest rate on 
loans or deposits to banks.36 
 
In recent decades the policy framework within which CB operates have undergone 
major changes. 37 Inflation targeting has emerged as the leading framework for 
monetary policy since the late 1980s.38 CBs in Canada, those in the euro area, the UK, 
New Zealand and even elsewhere have introduced an explicit inflation target.39 Many 
developing countries are also making a transition from targeting a monetary aggregate 
(a measure of the volume of money in circulation) to an inflation-targeting 
framework.40  CBs affect economic growth by controlling the liquidity in the financial 
system by using different monetary policy tools.41 But what does this entails? Well 
firstly, open market operations involve the buying or selling of securities.42 For 
instance to increase the amount of money in circulation and decrease the interest rate 
for borrowing, the CB can buy government bonds, bills or other government-issued 
notes.43  This buying however can lead to higher inflation so in order to absorb money 
and reduce inflation, the CB will sell government bonds on the open market, which 
increases the interest rate and discourages borrowing.44 The objective of the open 
market operations is to steer short-term interest rates and in turn influence longer-term 
rates and overall economic activity.45  Would this be feasible in developing countries? 
Research has shown that is not as effective especially in low income developing 
                                                
34 Georgsson (n 15) 19 
35 ibid  
36 ibid  
37 ‘Monetary Policy and Central Banking’ (n 30)  
38 ibid 
39 ibid 
40 ibid 
41 Kimberly Amadeo, ‘Central Banks’ Function and Role’ (2017) US Economy, The Balance 
< https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-central-bank-definition-function-and-role-3305827 
> accessed 22 July 2017. 
42 Georgsson (n 15) 20  
43 Reem Heakal, ‘What are Central Banks’ (2015) Investopedia < 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/050703.asp > accessed 22 July 2017. 
44 ibid 
45 ‘Monetary Policy and Central Banking’ (n 30) 
7 
 
countries as compared to developed countries so it is important for countries to 
develop a framework to enable CBs to target short-term rates before transitioning 
from monetary to inflation targeting.46 CBs sets targets on interest rates they charge 
their member banks either when they borrow or deposit money with the CB.47  After 
the global financial crises, CB in developed economies would lower interest rates 
until the short-term rates are near zero, hence limiting the option to cut the policy 
rates further (conventional monetary options) however as deflation rose, CB 
undertook unconventional monetary options as well as buying bonds particularly in 
the US, UK, euro area and even Japan mainly to further lowering long-term rates and 
loosening monetary conditions.48  Some even lower short-term rates below zero.49  
Reserve requirements, that is, when banks are obliged to deposit money with the CB 
at zero or very low interest rates, are also a common monetary policy instrument.50  
The choice of monetary framework is often linked to the choice of exchange rate 
regime that exists in a country. 51   So could this determine the level of CB 
independence? Research shows that a country that has a fixed exchange rate will have 
limited scope for an independent monetary policy versus one with a more flexible 
exchange rate.52  Countries with a flexible exchange rate still try to manage its level, 
which could involve a trade-off in order to ensure price stability.53 
!
1.2 Financial Stability and Regulatory Functions 
Financial stability refers to having a stable payment system, guaranteeing that the 
payment system in place has sufficient means of payment for its function as a lender 
of last resort as well as regulating and supervising financial institutions.54  It is 
important to have a stable and efficient infrastructure to make payments in order to 
have a smooth functioning economy.55  There is also a need for a credit system that 
                                                
46 ‘Monetary Policy and Central Banking’ (n 30) 
47 Georgsson (n 15) 20  
48 ‘Monetary Policy and Central Banking’ (n 30) 
49 ibid 
50 Georgsson (n 15) 20  
51 ‘Monetary Policy and Central Banking’ (n 30) 
52 ibid 
53 ibid 
54 Georgsson (n 15) 10  
55 ibid 18  
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converts savings to investment and a system for managing risk.56  “A stable and 
efficient payment and credit system requires, in brief, that the financial system as a 
whole has the ability to maintain a number of fundamental functions.”57  The 
robustness and effective functioning of these systems is a policy responsibility where 
success is vital for ensuring financial stability.58 
 
CBs have rather a shared or full level of the oversight of the payment system.59  
Giving the CB this responsibility appears naturally because the CB stands at the 
center of the payment system infrastructure that often involves electronic interchange 
between various payment systems and the CB’s settlement account.60  CBs have 
historically often been owners and operators of payment systems for instance in the 
US, the Federal Reserve’s (FED’s) automated clearing-house (FED ACH), which is 
an electronic alternative to retail payment through checks.  In Europe examples 
include TARGET and TARGET2 system that provides real time payment and 
settlement of large value euro-denominated transaction.61  CBs are also usually users 
of high value payment system.62  The involvement in the payment system to an 
essential responsibility for the oversight is due to an increase in economic activity 
using payment systems, the role they play in crises situation such as the 9/11 attacks 
as well as an increase focus on regulatory efforts towards the systems rather than the 
individual institution domain.63  In cases where there are shocks or crises in the 
financial system, the CB task becomes even more important to support the payment 
and credit system.64  CBs may also be obliged to act as a lender of last resort to 
safeguard the stability of the system, hence their ultimate responsibility for the 
oversight of the system.65  The responsibility as lender of last resort allows the CBs to 
counteract with institutions in the system who might be engage in excessive risk 
taking due to their awareness of the support from CB in the event of crises.66 
 
                                                
56 Georgsson (n 15) 18  
57 ibid  
58 Archer (n 16) 36  
59 ibid  
60 ibid  
61 ibid  
62 ibid  
63 ibid 36-37  
64 Georgsson (n 15) 9  
65 ibid 19  
66 ibid 9 
9 
 
Other tasks aimed at financial stability include that of micro-prudential supervision, 
macro-prudential policy67 as well as investor protection activities.68 Micro-prudential 
supervision includes all on and off surveillance of the safety and soundness of 
individual financial institution with particular emphasis on the protection of depositor 
and other retail creditors.69  Macro-prudential policy involves all activities aimed at 
monitoring the exposure to systemic risk and identifying potential threats to stability 
that can arise as a result of macro-economic or financial market developments and 
infrastructure. 70  Investor protection activities focus mainly on the issuance and 
enforcement of rules on the conduct of business and disclosure of information.71  This 
task has been granted to CBs in some countries whereas in others it is the 
responsibility of separate financial supervisory authorities72  in favor of a more 
generalized financial stability objective for the CB itself.73  But why would such an 
important responsibility be separate from a CB? Critics claim there might be a 
conflict of interest between the different duties of the CB as a result of the difference 
in nature of the regulatory and monetary functions.74  The regulatory functions might 
require the microeconomic decisions of the short-term nature that is contrary to the 
macroeconomic activities that are long-term. 75   “Monetary policy is usually 
countercyclical, while the effects of regulation and supervision tend to be pro-
cyclical, offsetting to some extent the objectives of monetary policy.”76 On the other 
hand, arguments in favor of prudential supervision stress that CB access to prudential 
information on systemically relevant institutions is essential for the conduct of macro-
prudential monitoring.77 Micro-prudential information allows more accurate estimates 
                                                
67 Georgsson (n 15) 9 
68 ‘The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision’ (2001) European Central Bank 3 < 
 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf > accessed 24 July 
2017. 
69 ibid  
70 ibid  
71 ibid  
72 Georgsson (n 15) 19  
73 Archer (n 16) 28  
74 ‘The Role of Central Bank: What are the Roles and Functions of Central Banks? Why do 
They Need Economic Staff? How Far Should Central Banks Get Involved in Data Collection 
and Areas Such as Seasonal Adjustment as Well as Economic Analysis?’ Ivory Research.com 
< http://www.ivoryresearch.com/samples/economics-essay-example-the-role-of-central-bank/ 
> accessed 24 July 2017. 
75 ibid  
76 ibid  
77 ‘The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision’ (n 68) 4 
10 
 
on economic activity and inflationary pressures to be achieved, thereby favoring the 
choice of a more appropriate stance for monetary policy as some analysis in the US 
has provided.78  In cases of financial crises, CB would be involved and so supervisory 
input is crucial for accessing whether illiquid bank requesting emergency liquidity 
assistance is solvent so as to limit the scope of moral hazard.79 However it is 
important to note that independence of supervision authority from political 
interference is also essential for effective supervision especially in developing 
countries where the ‘policy loans’ (loans granted under formal or informal pressures 
from governmental authorities still exist).80  The laws, regulation or acts of public 
administration may interfere with entrepreneurial choices of financial institutions.81  
In cases where these institutions encounter difficulties due to wrong incentives, 
pressures to bail them out might be high; hence CBs independence might shelter 
supervision from external intervention as well as risk of regulatory capture by the 
supervised entities.82   
 
Credibility is also a major concern since if a bank fails when the CB holds 
responsibility for monitoring and control, this can result in a lost of confidence and 
trust.83  Issues of efficiency and development are part of the systemic mandate and led 
to changes in the governance structure to enhance the effectiveness of the financial 
stability functions especially after the global financial crisis.84  What was the result of 
these changes? In the US, the Financial Regulation Bill (Dodd-Frank Act) led the 
creation of a new Financial Stability Council (FSOC) headed by the Treasury 
Secretary and independent from the FED.85 The UK Treasury reformed the tripartite 
model and led to the inception of a new Financial Policy Committee within the BoE 
with primary statutory responsibility for maintaining financial stability.86  In Europe, 
following the recommendations of the de Larosière report, the European Commission 
                                                
78 ‘The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision’ (n 68) 4 
79 ibid 5 
80 ibid  
81 ibid  
82 ibid  
83 ‘The Role of Central Bank: What are the Roles and Functions of Central Banks? Why do 
They Need Economic Staff? How Far Should Central Banks Get Involved in Data Collection 
and Areas Such as Seasonal Adjustment as Well as Economic Analysis?’ (n 74) 
84 Archer (n 16) 34  
85 Denis Beau et al., ‘Macro-Prudential Policy and the Conduct of Monetary Policy’ (2012) 
Bank of France 4 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132404 > accessed 22 July 2017. 
86 ibid 
11 
 
(EC) created the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and is independent from the 
European Central Bank (ECB).87 However, in contrast to its US counterpart, the 
ESRB is not fully in control of the macro-prudential tools.88  With the creation of CBs 
in developing Caribbean countries from the 1960s onwards, the primary responsibility 
for promoting monetary stability and a sound financial system was delegated to the 
CBs.89 Apart from regulating and supervising the financial institutions and as a result 
of the problems experienced especially by non-bank institutions due to a lack of 
supervision, some Caribbean countries have placed these institutions under direct 
supervision of the CBs.90  
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87 Beau et al., (n 85) 
88 ibid 
89 DeLisle Worrell et al., ‘Financial System Soundness in the Caribbean: An Initial 
Assessment’ (2001) IMF Working Paper WP/01/123, 10 < 
 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01123.pdf > accessed 5 August 2017. 
90 ibid  
12 
 
CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE  
 
2.1 Independence  
 
The concept of CB as an independent institution is not a new phenomenon and has 
been at the forefront sine the 1980s.91  CBI refers to the freedom to conduct monetary 
policy without direct governmental influence.92 A CB must have clearly defined and 
prioritized objectives, sufficient authority to achieve these objectives and be 
independent to also remain credible.93  Independence also means that the decisions 
taken by a CB in the conduct of its functions will not be countermanded by any other 
branch of government only in extreme cases; without this, it would only be a mockery 
to a CB’s independence.94  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) supports CBI 
since it facilitates price and financial sector stability that leads to sustainable 
economic growth.95 The ability to independently set policy goals and pursue them can 
lead to monetary outcomes that wouldn’t have been possible with political 
intervention.96  However, the level of independence granted in pursuit of monetary 
policy varies from country to country taking into account that no CB is completely 
independent from governmental interference.97 
 
2.2 Importance of CBI 
 
In order to achieve real sustainable economic growth, it is important to ensure 
financial sector stability.98  Variable inflation over a certain threshold prevents 
sustainable economic growth.99  Inflation has a negative effect on how effectively 
prices are used to allocate scarce resources.100  Inflation also affects the decisions 
made in relation to investment and savings and often more beneficial to the wealthy 
owning land, real estate or stocks due to the redistribution of wealth.101  Government 
                                                
91 Carroll Griffin, ‘The External Impacts of Central Bank Independence’ (2010) Fontbonne 
University < http://dx.doi.org/10.10.1590/S1519-70772010000300005 > accessed 1 August 
2017. 
92 Howells (n 6) 3  
93 Lybek (n 12) 1  
94 Blinder (n 7) 9 
95 ibid 
96 ibid 
97 de Haan and Eijffinger (n 13) 2 
98 Lybek (n 12) 2 
99 ibid  
100 ibid  
101 ibid  
13 
 
may also be tempted to cut into the inflation taxes and high inflation negatively 
affects the budget due to increase in interest rates and delays that may be encountered 
in collecting taxes.102  Although it might be enticing to utilize inflation to ‘solve’ 
short-term problems, it is detrimental to real economic growth by not addressing the 
underlying challenges presently at hand.103   
 
Some scholars argue that in a democracy, the government is accountable to the 
electorate and the ultimate goals of monetary policy is the duty of the elected 
government104 but the conduct of monetary policy in pursuit of those goals should be 
free from political control.105 Government tend to have many short-term objectives 
including being re-elected and might not place emphasis on price stability as the 
underlying objective. Within the CB, there are officials who have career concerns and 
may want to appear as competent as possible looking ahead toward future 
employment.106  Given these two different incentive structures, certain activities 
should be delegated to non-elected officials especially when monitoring of effort and 
talent is important due to the technical nature of tasks.107  Is monetary policy 
considered a technical issue? Under normal circumstances, it is a policy task that is 
relatively technical in nature;108 therefore to enhance both credibility and flexibility, it 
would be better to delegate the task to an independent and accountable CB that has a 
clearly defined objective.109 Overall, as long as there is short-term ‘price stickiness’ it 
is better to have an independent CB weighing price stability higher than the social 
objective function to defuse the intolerant behavior of the government and the ability 
to better utilize new information.110 
 
2.3 Types of Independence  
 
There are different types of independence granted to CBs and comprise of: a) organic, 
b) functional, and c) financial.111  
                                                
102 Lybek (n 12) 2 
103 ibid  
104 de Haan and Eijffinger (n 13) 5  
105 Lybek (n 12) 2  
106 de Haan and Eijffinger (n 13) 9  
107 ibid  
108 ibid  
109 Lybek (n 12) 2  
110 ibid 3-5  
111 Lucotte (n 3) 4  
14 
 
Organic independence refers to the conditions that exist on how to appoint, renew or 
remove the CB executives as well as the composition of the CB’s governing bodies; 
for instance, if a government representative has (or not) the right to sit and vote within 
these authorities.112 Recent studies have focused on the real term of the governor’s 
mandates such as the terms of reference as well as the synchronization between the 
mandate of the governor and of the chief of executive power.113 
 
Functional independence also known as operational independence refers to the 
freedom that the CB has not only in the definition of objectives to pursue but also to 
conduct monetary policy that includes the choice of instruments.114  Independence 
refers to the CB’s ability to use the instruments of monetary control with or without 
instruction, guidance or interference from government.115  Functional independence 
can further be sub-divided into: a) goal independence b) target independence and c) 
instrument independence.   
- Goal independence entrusts the CB with the responsibility for determining the 
monetary policy and exchange rate regime, or simply the monetary policy if it 
is a floating exchange rate.116  It gives the CB the authority to determine its 
primary objective from among several objectives outlined in the CB statute or 
rarely to determine the objective if there is no clearly defined one.117  In the 
UK, the BoE lacks goal independence since the inflation target is set by the 
government whereas in the US the FED’s goals are set in its legal charter, but 
these goals are described in vague terms (e.g. maximum employment).118  So 
how does the FED determine its goals? Well this leaves the FED to translate 
these into operational goals, hence allowing the FED a high level of goal 
independence.119  
- Target independence also entrust the CB with responsibility for determining 
monetary policy and the exchange rate regime, or simply monetary policy if it 
                                                
112 Lucotte (n 3) 5  
113 ibid 4  
114 ibid  
115 ibid  
116 Lybek (n 12) 3  
117 ibid  
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is a floating exchange rate.120  However, there is only one clearly defined 
primary objective stipulated in law.121  The CB has the independence in the 
choice of specific target (monetary base, interest rate, inflation rate) to pursue 
its legislative objective such as price stability.122  
- Instrument independence is when the government or the legislature decides 
the monetary policy or target, in agreement with the CB and the exchange rate 
regime, but the CB keeps sufficient authority to implement the monetary 
policy target using the instrument it sees fit.123  The BoE while lacking goal 
independence, has instrument independence, given its inflation mandate set by 
the government, it is able to set its instruments with or without influence from 
the government.124   
Financial independence refers to the role government or parliament plays with regard 
to the budget of the CB.125  If the government has influence over the CB’s budget, this 
may make the CB more vulnerable to influence in its monetary policy decisions.126  
For example if Congress would have the power to reduce the FED’s surplus and that 
“If carried far enough, stripping the FED of its liquid assets would obviously interfere 
with its ability to conduct monetary and credit policy. Equally important, however, it 
would undermine the FED’s financial independence by denying it enough interest 
income to finance its operations without having to ask Congress for appropriations or 
resorting to inflationary money creation.”127 It also looks at the possibility or to what 
extent of a government to finance its expenditure by resorting directly or indirectly to 
advances and loans from the CB. 128   CB financial problems have been quite 
prominent for decades, in particular, those difficult situations where CB financial 
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structures have been debilitated by quasi-fiscal operations.129  
2.4 Independence in Relation to Accountability  
While many countries have undergone reform making their CBs more independent, 
the idea that CB should be completely independent has come under criticism.130 Why 
such criticism when independence is said to be beneficial for the economy? 
Traditionally, CBs often had a reputation for secrecy and mystery; their language was 
often designed to blur and obfuscate.131 One of the most memorable replies given by a 
CB governor to a member of parliament some years ago, was “If I seem unduly clear 
to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”132  However, since the 2008 
financial crisis, the power of CBs has grown, as they have used unorthodox tools to 
stimulate the economy, taken a greater role in financial regulation, and put themselves 
in more politically sensitive positions including entering into tough debt 
negotiation.133  Despite the powerful role, central bankers seem to be remarkably 
insulated from democratic oversight. 134  A recent ‘Buttonwood’ column in The 
Economist stated that, “Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi are very important players in 
the world economy, arguably more important than the US President or the German 
chancellor.  And yet they are not elected; if voters do not like the job they are doing, 
they cannot get rid of them.”135  
The main objection towards independent CB is a lack of accountability.136 But what 
does accountability means and accountable to who? “Accountability refers to the legal 
obligation to give an account of a bank’s actions and performance, which derives 
from the delegation of power.”137 An independent CB is ultimately accountable to the 
general public but maybe directly accountable to the executive branch or the 
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legislature.138  It often depends on the government structure, in newer CB laws, it is 
often the legislature; the CB is formally accountable to avoid dilution of 
responsibilities.139 But overall, a CB should be subject to both government and public 
scrutiny.140  No CB can be totally independent that it does not have to report to 
anyone.141 As with any public institution, principles of good governance require that 
CBs with a sufficient degree of independence operate in a clear legal and operational 
framework.142 The CB must ensure that both the government and the public are 
continually kept informed of its actions.143 Regular discussions between the CB, the 
government and the legislative branch also need to be established, in order for the CB 
to be accountable for its actions.144  
Transparency is a very important element of accountability. 145   “Transparency 
improves policy, because policy makers operating in the light of day cannot do some 
of the things they can do in the dark of secrecy.”146 Information concerning the 
behavior of CB is crucial for the evaluation of its performance.147 However, while the 
informational model of accountability obligates CBs to explain their actions, it 
reduces this process to a simple publication of data.148  This alone is not enough, 
hence what else should be done to be effective? The missing part is the back and forth 
of question and answer which is the process of genuine debate and deliberation.149  By 
the mid-2000s, central bankers were being treated like oracles, with Alan Greenspan 
as the most revered among them.150  There must be more room for dissent both among 
those with the power to set monetary policy and in the wider society that is affected 
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by those policies.151All information should be released, unless a good case can be 
made to the contrary, for example in order to preserve the confidentiality of 
proprietary information on financial institutions collected by CBs, or in the case of 
foreign exchange market transactions.152 More generally, CBs need to balance the 
efficiency and accountability gains of greater transparency against the need for 
confidentiality.153  
Delegating policy to a CB requires some mechanism to ensure accountability.154  The 
degree of independence granted affects the structure of the governing bodies and the 
accountability provisions.155  Strong accountability provisions are essential with 
increased level of independence to ensure that a CB use its delegated authority 
effectively and efficiently to achieve its objective, as well as other tasks and prudently 
manages its resources.156 Overall, as CBs become more independent and take on an 
increasingly powerful role in these highly uncertain times, there must be proper ways 
of ensuring full accountability of their actions. 
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CHAPTER 3: MEASUREMENT OF CB’s LEGAL INDEPENDENCE  
(Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti – CWN Index) 
 
The past two decades have witnessed a widespread of CB’s legislative reforms in 
many countries granting greater independence to CBs157 and removing monetary 
policy from the hands of government.158  The CWN index is the most widely 
employed index measuring CB’s independence and is based on four (4) legal 
characteristics as described in a CB’s charter.159  These four legal characteristics 
refers to: a) the primary objective of monetary policy b) the extent of policy decisions 
and implementation independent of government c) the governance structure 
(appointment, dismissal and term of office of CB governors; and d) limitations on the 
government’s ability to borrow from the CB.160   
 
3.1 Primary Objective – Price Stability  
 
According to the CWN index, a CB is more independent if its charter states that price 
stability is the sole or primary goal of monetary policy.161  But why would this lead to 
greater independence when in fact many developed countries have multiple objectives 
such as the FED in the US? The establishment of a single objective for the CB, at a 
minimum, a clearly defined primary objective provides a more precise basis for 
delegating authority to the CB and holding it accountable for its policy outcomes and 
its financial condition. 162   In contrast, multiple objectives can hamper CB’s 
effectiveness, dilute accountability and complicate the coordination of economic 
policies with the government.163   
Narrowing the objectives towards a single or dominant one result in an increase in 
clarity for monetary policy.164  Price stability is usually the dominant policy objective 
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specified in legislation165 illustrating a change of attitude concerning the cost of 
inflation.166 Price stability in the domestic purchasing power of the currency appears 
as the dominant or one of the dominant legal objectives extracted from thirty three 
(33) of nearly fifty (50) CB’s legislation.167  In most cases, it is a singular objective or 
its superior to the other macroeconomic objectives specified in law.168 But what is the 
importance of such dominance?  Some critics believe that achieving and maintaining 
price stability is the best contribution monetary policy can make towards sustainable 
economic growth.169 This is however based on the analytical view that monetary 
policy is best suited to achieve medium-term control over inflation, while its output 
and employment effects are not viewed as either sufficiently predictable or permanent 
to increase economic activity or lower unemployment. 170   Hence, if other 
macroeconomic objectives are not made as subsidiaries to price stability, they can 
weaken the credibility of monetary policy by eroding clarity and transparency.171   
Not having price stability legally specified as the prime objective of monetary policy 
among others could lead the listed objectives becoming more general in nature.172  
This is because it would result in not having a legally dominant objective and a broad 
definition of currency value is used.173 In developed countries such as the UK174 
Germany as well as the entire euro area, the CBs primary objective is to deliver price 
stability175 whereas in developing Caribbean countries, there is no CB that focuses 
exclusively on price stability.176 But why would such small open economies in this 
region focus on several objectives? Well critics believe that this is tempered by the 
desire to avoid financial crises, achieve real economic growth, improve international 
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competiveness and diversify economic activity.177 Below illustrates the objectives of 
the three (3) developing Caribbean countries that are critical to this research (Belize, 
Barbados and Jamaica).  
 
Central Bank of Belize Act effective 1982 
“Within the context of the economic policy of the government, the bank shall be 
guided in all of its actions by the objectives of fostering monetary stability, especially 
as regards to stability of the exchange rate, and promoting credit and exchange 
conditions conducive to the growth of the economy of Belize.”178 
 
Central Bank of Barbados Act effective 1972 
“The purpose of the central bank shall be to regulate the issue, supply, availability and 
international exchange of money; to promote monetary stability; to promote a sound 
financial structure; to foster the development of money and capital markets in 
Barbados; and to foster credit and exchange conditions conducive to the orderly and 
sustained economic development of Barbados.”179 
 
Bank of Jamaica Act effective 1960 
“The principal objects of the bank shall be to issue and redeem notes and coins; to 
keep and administer the external reserves of Jamaica; to influence the volume and 
conditions of supply of credit so as to promote the fullest expansion in production, 
trade and employment consistent with the maintenance of monetary stability in 
Jamaica and the external value of the currency; to foster the development of money 
and capital markets in Jamaica; and to act as banker to the government.”180 
 
It shows that all three developing countries have a broader mandate of objectives as 
compared to developed countries. Belize showing a slightly narrower spectrum while 
Jamaica showing the broadest ranges of objectives.  It also seems as if though some 
core functions has been included as part of its objectives  (issue, supply, availability 
and international exchange of money; issue and redeem notes and coins; banker to the 
government) especially as it relates to Barbados and Jamaica.   
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What are the effects of having such a broad spectrum of objectives? The broader the 
mandate a CB has, the more it will be forced to find a balance between different 
objectives, tasks and tools.181  Potential conflicts arise when different monetary policy 
actions are motivated by different objectives.182  In the Caribbean, the most persistent 
conflict arose between external price competitiveness and price stability; reflected in 
efforts to stabilize exchange rates.183  Because devaluation is the principal source of 
high inflation, the Bank of Jamaica (BoJ) tried a variety of mechanism to steady the 
nominal exchange rate over the past 20 years.184  Was this successful? Unfortunately, 
over the years, these efforts was ineffective because the public perceived the 
exchange rate was not competitive; implying that Jamaica did not earn enough foreign 
exchange to cover import demand at that rate;185 hence led to the devaluation of the 
currency multiple times.186 
 
These multiple objectives witnessed in the Caribbean have been reflected in the 
frequent bailout of failed institutions.187  For instance in 2010, the government of 
Belize (GoB) had to bailout the ailing sugar industry that was considered “too big to 
fail” in order to provide a temporary solution to avert a major crises in the sugar belt 
that would have displaced thousands of families.188 How was this possible? The 
government issued a five (5) year treasury note that was bought by, no other than the 
CB of Belize.189  The government of Barbados also rescued the Barbados National 
Bank in 1994 when it became insolvent as a result of the impairment of 70% of its 
loan portfolio.190  The potential increase in narrow money; one third of the total 
money supply was averted by the issue of long-term debt.191  Then the BoJ assumed 
the direction of Century National Bank in 1996 after an injection of official funds 
                                                
181 Georgsson (n 15) 21  
182 Archer (n 16) 23  
183 Worrell and Belgrave (n 176) 284  
184 ibid 
185 ibid 285  
186 ‘Foreign Exchange Controls: What it Means to You!’ Central Bank of Belize Public 
Education Series <  https://www.centralbank.org.bz/docs/default-source/4.7-educational-
materials/foreign-exchange-controls--what-it-means-to-you-.pdf?sfvrsn=8 > accessed 1 
August 2017. 
187 Worrell and Belgrave (n 176) 284  
188 Jose Sanchez, ‘Sugar Industry Gets Multi-Million Dollar Bailout’ (2010) News 5 < 
 http://edition.channel5belize.com/archives/43318 > accessed 27 July 2017. 
189 ibid 
190 Worrell and Belgrave (n 176) 284  
191 ibid  
23 
 
failed to avert insolvency.192  In 1997 the Eagle Bank Group was forced to sell to 
FINSAC, which was a newly established financial restructuring agency belonging to 
the government of Jamaica.193  
 
3.2 Extent of Policy Decisions and Implementation Independent of Government - 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy  
 
The Caribbean’s small, open economies are particularly vulnerable to several external 
shocks, including terms of trade and financing shocks, as well as frequent natural 
disasters.194  A well functioning and suitable monetary policy regime is an important 
tool to help preserve macroeconomic stability and absorb external shocks.195  Having 
a desirable monetary policy framework is one that keeps inflation expectations well 
anchored and minimizes unnecessary fluctuations of economic activity around its 
trend path in response of shocks.196  The choice of appropriate monetary and 
exchange rate regime is somewhat controversial at times.197  Why is that? Based on 
traditional theory, the fixed exchange rate regimes with free capital flows may reduce 
the economy’s volatility arising from monetary (or nominal) shocks, but exacerbate 
those as a result of real shocks (such as terms of trade fluctuations).198  Yet a fixed 
exchange rate regime may enhance monetary policy credibility if the commitment to 
the peg is perceived as credible.  In contrast, a more flexible regime may not only 
assist to buffer real shocks but, if grouped with a credible monetary or inflation target, 
have minor costs in terms of reducing or maintaining low inflation.199   
 
Monetary policy decision-making and implementation are the defining characteristics 
of a CB however, there are differences between countries as to how extensive the 
CB’s independent responsibilities are in relation to monetary policy making.200  
According to research, the average CB reports a high degree of involvement in 
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objective setting for monetary policy but not complete independence.201  Whereas 
complete independence or very nearly, is reported for the decision-making and 
implementation stages of monetary policy function.202  
 
Current monetary and supervisory arrangement in the developing Caribbean has 
evolved from the colonial heritage these countries inherited and the particular form of 
government.203  With the exception of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), 
CBs arrangement would allow the elected officials to effectively control monetary 
policy.204 Therefore, monetary policy is subject to the uncertainties of political cycles 
and has an upward inflation bias.205 
 
This section looks at how policy decision-making is done in the three (3) selected 
developing Caribbean jurisdictions. 
 
3.2.1 Belize 
 
Within the CB legislative framework in Belize, the CB is responsible for formulating 
and implementing monetary policy but within the context of the economic activity of 
the government.206  The bank focus is on the stability of the exchange rate and 
economic growth.207  Belize has also maintained a fixed exchange rate of BZ$2.00 to 
US$1.00 since 1976.208 What is the importance of having a fixed exchange rate? It 
represents a cornerstone of macroeconomic stability, anchors inflation expectations 
and affords a stable environment for investment decisions.209  In order to maintain the 
fixed exchange rate in relation to the US dollar over such long period, the GoB 
simultaneously passed the Exchange Controls Regulations Act under which the 
system of domestic exchange control regulations was set in place.  Since then, the 
exchange controls have enabled the monitoring of inflows and outflows.  This is vital 
for the compilation of the external balance of payment statistics and also provides a 
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means of managing capital inflows and outflows to reduce the likelihood of 
dangerous and unsustainable imbalances that drain foreign reserve holdings.210 In a 
small, import-dependent country like Belize, this regime works well because the 
currency is protected from large savings in value that can be caused by one or more 
large transactions.211  Unlike developed countries, the Belizean economy is only about 
0.01% of the size of the US economy and is characterized by a significantly lower 
quantity and variety of transactions.212  It is more vulnerable to the destabilizing 
impact that a single large transaction can have.213  
 
Commercial banks dominate lending in the financial system; hence monetary policy 
targets commercial banks’ liquidity through the CB’s management of the monetary 
base (reserve balances). 214   Adjustments in the monetary base, through the 
manipulation of reserve requirements (which is an instrument of monetary policy) 
affect credit growth, interest rates and the level of money supply.215  To accomplish 
its monetary policy objectives, the CB can use a mixture of direct and indirect policy 
tools to influence the supply and demand of money.216 Direct policy tools include 
direct interest rate, credit control and lending control.217 The CB does not currently set 
interest rates levied by domestic banks except for the minimum interest rate payable 
on savings deposits.218  The bank has opted not to use the interest rate control as a tool 
of monetary policy but to let market forces determine interest rate.219  Also the CB 
has not exercised credit control in its implementation of monetary policy. 220  
However, it may provide credit, back by collateral to domestic banks to meet their 
short-term liquidity needs as lender of last resort.221  The interest is set at a punitive 
rate to encourage banks to efficiently manage their liquidity.222  The CB seems to 
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make use of the indirect policy tools more often in order to alter liquidity condition.223  
While the use of the reserve requirement has been the traditional monetary tool of 
choice, more recently the CB has shifted towards the use of open market operations to 
manage liquidity in the financial system and to signal its policy stance.224 
 
In 2004, the country was recommended to tighten its monetary policy and contain 
credit growth in order to reduce pressures on the exchange rate especially in the short 
run.225  It is also vital in the long run along with a strong fiscal adjustment to protect 
the balance of payments and support the exchange rate peg, a critical anchor for 
confidence stability.226 
 
3.2.2 Barbados  
 
The CB of Barbados is also been tasked to formulate monetary policy in association 
with the government to assist the country’s economic development programme.227  
Similar to Belize, Barbados also operate under a fixed exchange rate regime which is 
pegged to the US since the 1970s at a rate of BBD$2 to US$1;228 hence the focus has 
been to maintain the exchange rate with the US dollar and to influence the interest 
rate and overall excess liquidity of the banking system.229  Barbados heavily depends 
on direct interest rates to conduct their monetary policy with supporting instruments 
of moral suasion, commercial banks cash reserves and security requirement, credit 
controls and advances and rediscounts.230  During the period of 1975 to 1993, the 
bank implemented credit controls, policy on credit ceilings on distributional and 
personal sectors, concessions and exceptions in order to manage credit demand in the 
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economy but no longer utilize such policy.231  Why the change in policy instrument?  
As such it became a dormant policy instrument and because the credit flows was left 
to equilibrate on its own.232Today the country is more actively utilizing other policy 
options like interest rates, cash reserves and security requirement.233  In 2004, there 
was a modification of the monetary policy by reducing the minimum rate of interest 
payable on deposits from 2.5% to 2.25% annually.234 This reduction in the minimum 
deposit rate was accompanied by an equal and simultaneous cut in interest rates on 
loans from commercial banks.235 But what was the purpose for this adjustment? The 
adjustment in the minimum deposit rate was intended to signal to commercial banks a 
need for a cut in lending rates with a view to decreasing the operational costs of local 
businesses.236 There was also a major shift in 2013 when the bank adopted the three 
(3) month Treasury bill rate as a benchmark indicator.237 This was mainly to smooth 
out the process of adjusting the domestic interest rates in response to changes in the 
foreign rates in order to minimize the potential losses in the international reserve.238 
Even though the banks were initially required to hold 1% of Treasury bills and 2% 
cash reserve ratio of their total deposits, there has been a need to continuously make 
adjustment to achieve policy outcomes.239 Since 2013, the CB intervenes in the 
Treasury bill market to influence the average rate at which the bills are sold. 
 
3.2.3 Jamaica  
 
In Jamaica, the elected government sets the national macroeconomic goals and 
objectives.240 This is however an executive function with the formulation of sectoral 
plans delegated to the Planning Institute and allied agencies.241  In the process of 
setting broad sectoral targets, the role of the BoJ is that of maintaining relative price 
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stability and exchange rate competitiveness.242 In contrast to the exchange rate regime 
in Belize and Barbados, Jamaica operate under a ‘managed’ float system in which 
market forces are allowed to affect the value of their currency within certain upper 
and lower limits.243  But how does the bank keep the value of their currency when the 
market plays a vital role?  This is where the CB ‘attempts’ to keep the value of the 
currency from fluctuating too widely by buying and selling foreign exchange in 
sufficient quantities to influence the market.244  With this said, it is of vital importance 
for a CB operating under such a regime to maintain large stocks of foreign currency 
reserve in order to facilitate those transactions.  Has Jamaica been successful under 
this regime?  Evidence has shown that the value of the domestic currency in Jamaica 
has depreciated multiple times over the years with a value of JM$106 to US$1 and as 
much as JM$206 to US$1 respectively as at December 2013.245 This clearly illustrates 
that such a regime is more difficult to administer and the interventions of the CB have 
only a limited and temporary effect in the world foreign currency market.246 
The target for inflation is set by the BoJ but approved by the Minister of Finance 
(MoF).247  The target is then incorporated in a financial programme that outlines and 
defines the main economic variables that are considered with the inflation target.248  
The CB currently follows a mixed monetary policy strategy and is reflected by its use 
of both interest rate and money supply aggregate as policy instruments.249 However 
the dominant influence appears to be based on monetarist theory because the focus of 
the most of the policy instruments is on the absorption of liquidity and control of the 
monetary aggregate250 as in the case of Belize and Barbados.251  For many years, 
monetary control relied on the use of high reserve requirement, special deposits and 
sectoral credit ceilings among others that were effective when prices, incomes, 
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interest rates and the exchange rate were centrally set and controlled.252  However in 
the 1980s a financial reform programme shifted the burden of monetary control to 
market instruments with the BoJ creating and marketing its own CODs.253  But the 
decentralization of the foreign exchange market and the abandonment of the exchange 
control, the BoJ started its reliance on direct instruments used before while still 
continued to issue its own liabilities.254  High levels of excess reserves have been a 
persistent feature of Jamaica’s commercial banking system within the past two 
decades.255  Over the years, the reserve requirement has been amended several times 
however at the end of 2010, it was a total of 12%.256 As compared to Barbados (2% of 
cash reserve on deposits) Jamaica seem to be extremely high.  Is this feasible to 
achieve the objectives of monetary policy?  Even though having a high level of excess 
reserve can surely provide a positive impact in terms of the institutions’ ability to 
respond to liquidity shocks,257 questions have been raised as to whether or not this 
present challenges to the CB in its pursuit of price stability.258 Current open market 
operations are focused on repos and reserve repos that allow BoJ to fine-tune the 
short-term reserve or liquidity position of commercial bank with the nominal interest 
rate as the intermediate target. 
Overall, policy implementation and analysis must be carefully considered in the 
effective management of an economy. According to the CWN index, the greater the 
extent to which policy decisions are made independently of government involvement, 
the greater the independence.259  Based on the information presented, it illustrates a 
high degree of government involvement among the three (3) developing jurisdictions 
in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy as compared to developed 
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countries like the UK260 and Germany261 where CBs have been given the power to 
control monetary policy and decisions are made independently from government. 
3.3 Governance Structure - Appointment, Term of Office and Dismissal of 
Governors   
 
A CB legislative framework should clearly define the governance structure that will 
limit the risk of undue interference and government pressure in the exercise of its 
powers.262  There are different types of governing bodies depending on the degree of 
CBI.263  The composition of the governance structure should reflect its functions 
while at the same time try to depoliticize the decision making process and take into 
account country specific conditions, including corporate law.264  
 
The CWN index gives greater independence to a CB when the governor are appointed 
by the CB’s board of directors rather than by the prime minister (PM) or MoF, has a 
long term of office and is not subject to dismissal.265 These aspects help insulate the 
CB from political pressures.266 Based on this, a review of the governance structure 
was done on the basis of these criteria.  
3.3.1 Appointment  
The CB of Belize Act states that a governor shall be appointed by the governor 
general but on the advice of the PM.267 The CB of Barbados Act states that a governor 
shall be a person with recognized experience in financial matters and shall be 
appointed by the MoF.268 Based on the BoJ Act, the governor shall be appointed by 
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the MoF.269 
3.3.2 Term of Office 
In Belize the governor is appointed for a period not exceeding five (5) years but are 
eligible for re-appointment.270 In Barbados the governor is also appointed for a period 
not exceeding five (5) years and are also eligible for re-appointment. 271 In Jamaica, 
the situation is similar to that of Belize and Barbados.272 
3.3.3 Dismissal 
In Belize the governor general may terminate the appointment of the governor based 
on several cases presented in Section 15 (2) of the Act.273  The CB of Barbados Act 
does not explicitly state who may terminate the appointment of the governor but they 
are still subject to dismissal based on Section 13 of the Act presenting cases where a 
person may no longer hold office.274 Section 5 of the Schedule listed in the BoJ Act 
clearly shows that the governor is subject to dismissal by the MoF in cases closely 
related to both Belize and Barbados.275   
Theoretically it shows that there is severe government intervention on these criteria.  
In Belize the governor is appointment by the governor general but again subject to the 
discretion of the PM.  Meanwhile all three jurisdictions permit a medium term of 
office (5 years) with possibility of re-appointment but are all subject to dismissal.  
3.4 Limitations on the Government’s Ability to Borrow  
 
According to the CWN index, independence is greater if there are limitations on the 
government’s ability to borrow from the CB.276 This may also have an influence on a 
country’s fiscal deficit since by limiting credit to government, CB deprives the 
government from inflation tax and so constitutes a strong signal for fiscal 
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discipline.277  
As mentioned, over the years CB’s legislation have been reformed with the objective 
of defeating inflation; hence one of the pillars of this reform was restricting CB 
financing to the government.278  This was considered critical for building CB’s 
credibility, a key ingredient for achieving monetary policy effectiveness.279  Recently 
CB lending to the government have increased especially due to the ‘great recession’ 
causing governments to turn to CB for money as liabilities increased, tax revenues 
declined and financing for fiscal imbalance from domestic and international capital 
markets was expensive or unavailable.280 
 
Based on a review of CB laws from countries in selected regions, it shows that 
developed countries in Europe exhibits the most restrictive legal provisions, with 
these restrictions being driven by the limitations imposed by the treaty establishing 
the EC.281  However, at the other extreme countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific 
tend to have more lenient legislation in relation to CB financing to the government, 
with almost no country imposing full prohibitions and instead empowering the CB to 
grant advances and in some cases loans.282  Latin American countries like Brazil, 
Chile and Guatemala also have more stringent legal restrictions with some countries 
banning CB financing to the government at the constitutional level.283  But one might 
ask, why all the way at the constitutional level? Well probably because of the past 
episodes of hyperinflation linked to persistent financing of fiscal deficits by CB.284 In 
2010, Axel Weber then German Bundesbank president warned that “excessive deficits 
can cause tensions with monetary policy and may require higher interest rates if not 
corrected” whereas Mervyn King, at the time BoE governor, noted that “uncertainty 
about how and when fiscal policy will respond has a direct bearing on monetary 
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policy”.285  
As mentioned, the legal provisions on CB financing to the government seem to be 
inversely correlated to the country’s level of development. Research shows that while 
in two-thirds of the developed countries, CBs cannot finance the fiscal deficit this 
proportion falls to almost one-half in emerging market economies, and to only one-
fifth in developing countries. 286   So the question is, if lending is allowed to 
government, under what conditions should this be done?  While conditions might vary 
from one country to another, there are some common trends among countries.287  
These trends focuses on: a) possible beneficiaries of CB financing; b) who decides the 
interest rates charged on the loans; c) what limits are imposed on the amount of 
financing; and d) the maximum maturity date of CB loans to government.288 A review 
of the CB Acts in the three (3) Caribbean jurisdictions was done focusing on the 
trends previously mentioned to illustrate the legal restrictions on CB lending to 
government in this region. 
3.4.1 Possible Beneficiaries  
 
In the three (3) countries, legal provision for CB financing seem not only to benefit 
the government but have expanded these facilities to both public and private 
corporations.  Restricting CB financing to benefit exclusively the government is 
essential since it not only increases the chances of limiting broad monetization but 
also facilitates systemic liquidity management by the CB.289 
 
3.4.2 Interest Rate Decisions  
 
Less uniform provisions are found when it comes to the decision-making about the 
interest rate on the financing.  However in Belize interest rate are based on the CB 
terms and conditions290 whereas in Barbados, there seem to be room for negotiation 
since it is based on the terms and conditions agreed on.291  Meanwhile there is no 
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explicit provision highlighting the terms and conditions pertaining to the interest rates 
in Jamaica. Overall there is no specific legislated interest rate. 
 
3.4.3 Amount of Financing  
 
Legal provisions governing the amount of CB financing to government vary among 
the countries.  There’s a limit to the amount of credit granted to government based on 
relative measures common in the three countries as it relates to government revenues.  
In Belize advances cannot exceed 8.5% of the government revenues from the previous 
financial year292 whereas no reference was made as to the limit of such advances in 
Barbados; hence presuming a negotiation may be possible.  In Jamaica, advances may 
not exceed 30% of the estimated revenue for that financial year and there was also a 
provision relative to government’s estimated expenditure.293  This indicted that the 
BoJ shall not purchase or acquire, on a primary issue, securities issued or guaranteed 
by the government of a nominal value exceeding 40% of government’s estimated 
expenditure in that financial year or the percentage the House of Representatives may 
from time to time approve by resolution.294 As compared to developed countries like 
the UK, financing to the government is prohibited295 hence this can have a greater 
impact of fiscal deficit in developing countries as opposed to developed countries. 
 
3.4.4 Maturity of Loan 
 
The maturity of CB loans and in particular advances is concentrated on periods up to 
180 days or one (1) year.  But Belize’s CB Act provide additional provision indicating 
that securities issued or guaranteed by the government have a maturity period not 
exceeding ten (10) years.296 
 
Overall there can be room for improvement especially regarding the interest rates on 
loans.  There is no clear legislative rate in place so this may leave room for 
government intervention.  Involving the government in setting an interest rate can be 
a subject of concern, in particular countries with weak institutions as these 
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negotiations could probably tilt the balance in favor of government.297  Allowing 
government an active role in the negotiation process hinders the CB independence 
and credibility and might encourage government to use CB financing rather than to 
raise money from the market, internally or abroad.298 Could this be the reason for not 
having a legislated rate in place? The answer is questionable. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
  
4.1 Theoretical Evidence 
 
CBI has become one of the central concepts in monetary theory and policy.299  It is 
strongly believed that a high level of CBI with an explicit mandate to restrain 
inflation is essential to assure price stability.300  But isn’t there other alternative for 
ensuring price stability? Of course there are however CBI is often the most 
recommended.301  The theory underlying this view is linked to the time inconsistency 
model of Kydland and Prescott (1997) and Barro and Gordon (1983) based on the 
argument that government suffers from inflationary bias and as a result inflation is 
suboptimal.302  Rogoff (1985) proposed delegating monetary policy to an independent 
and ‘conservative’ central banker to reduce the inflationary bias.303  This type of 
‘conservatism’ accorded with the notion is that independent CBs are more concerned 
than the elected government with maintaining low and stable inflation that will lead to 
price stability;304 thus economic growth will be stimulated.305  The assumption is that 
conservative behavior is linked with rational decision-making and the ability to 
commit to long-run objectives306 as compared to political behavior that maybe 
motivated by short-run electoral considerations or may highly value short-run 
economic expansions while discounting the longer-run inflationary consequences of 
expansionary policies.307  So if the ability of the elected officials to distort monetary 
policy results in excessive inflation, it would be reasonable to assume that there 
should be lower rates of inflation in countries where CBs are independent of such 
pressure.308  
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Rogoff’s formulation reflects both a form of goal independence – the CB’s goals 
differ from those of the government – and instrument independence – the CB is 
assumed free to set policy to achieve its own objectives.309 Hence, CB has a greater 
level of independence when the goal is focused on price stability and when it has the 
power to control monetary policy to achieve this objective. Building on the 
assumption that because of this, CB in developed countries has a greater level of 
independence due to its narrow mandate, thus generate a lower level of inflation as 
compared to developing countries where inflation maybe higher as a result of a wider 
mandate of objectives; overall has a lower level of CBI. 
 
Reference is made to a CB in a developed country such as the BoE, with its primary 
objective, to deliver price stability and subject to that, support the government’s 
economic objectives including those for growth and employment.310 This objective 
clearly illustrates the difference between the BoE and the government’s mandate. 
However, as the case in developing country, the focus is on the CB of Belize’s 
primary objective which is simply not based on price stability alone, but also has the 
task to maintain the stability of the exchange rate, promote credit and exchange 
conditions conducive to the growth of the economy of Belize and within the context 
of the economic policy of Belize.311 The CB is also guided in all its actions in 
carrying out these objectives.312  Would it be possible to say that the CB of Belize 
lacks both goal and instrument independence? The objective gives an indication that 
the CB is not free from government influence to control monetary policy and to an 
extent the focus is based on the economic objectives of the government.  A very good 
example of this was when monetary policy underwent two swings between the 
periods of 1996 to 2007.313 Initially, the stance was restrictive under the United 
Democratic Party (UDP) government with the aim of moderating credit growth and 
reducing pressures on international reserves.314 Then came a period of loosening at 
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the behest of the incoming People’s United Party (PUP) government to free up 
monies to help fund a fast paced economic growth program.315 A gradual process of 
tightening then had to be undertaken to stem the ‘hemorrhaging’ of foreign reserves 
and protect the fixed exchange rate.316 As a result of the political motives, it is 
obvious that the CB of Belize was placed in a more difficult place to achieve its core 
objectives.  However in the UK, Chancellor Gordon Brown granted the BoE 
independence in 1997 to control monetary policy.317  In his statement he stated, “I 
want to set in place a long-term framework for economic prosperity.  I want to break 
from the boom bust economics of previous years."318  But would it still be possible to 
have government intervention? This might have been the case witnessed back in 2003 
with the government’s most notorious decision to shift the target rate from the Retail 
Price Index (RPI) to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with the aim of bringing the UK 
more in line with the Euro.319 However speaking at a Bank Future Forum in October 
2016, current Governor Mark Carney expressed that it became difficult for the BoE 
when politicians commented on its policies rather than its objectives.320 He made it 
clear that while politicians have done a ‘good job’ of setting up the system in which 
the bank operates, “we are not going to take instruction on our policies from the 
political side.”321 Importantly since 1997 UK inflation has remained close to the 
government’s target of 2%; this is much lower than the UK inflation in the 1980s that 
reached 10%.322 
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4.2 Empirical Evidence (Legal Indicators and TOR of Governors) 
 
4.2.1 Legal Indicators 
 
There has been empirical evidence suggesting that countries with greater CBI have 
lower rates of inflation. 323   This evidence generally, consists of cross-country 
regressions using proxies of CBI and the (TOR) of CB governors.324  In particular, 
studies found that developed countries demonstrate a negative relationship between 
legal independence and inflation. 325   The estimated effect of independence on 
inflation was statistically and economically significant.326 Based on data from the 
high inflation years of the 1970s, for example, moving from the status of the BoE 
prior to the 1997 reforms that increased its independence to the level of independence 
then enjoyed by the German Bundesbank would be associated with a drop in annual 
average inflation of four percentage points.327 While standard indexes of CBI were 
negatively associated with inflation among developed economies, this was not the 
case among developing economies.328  
CWN index (1992) and Cukierman (1994) summarize the empirical regularities in the 
correlation between CBI on the one hand and inflation and economic growth on the 
other as follows:  
1.) Among developed countries, the legal CBI index introduced in CWN is 
negatively correlated with inflation, but the (TOR) of CB governors has no 
correlation with inflation;   
2.) Among developing countries, the legal CBI index of CWN is not correlated with 
inflation, but the TOR is significantly related to inflation.329   
 
This shows that the legal CWN index is good indicator for measuring CBI for 
developed countries whereas the TOR is better for measuring CBI in developing 
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countries. An analysis was done for the BoE (developed country) using the legal 
indicators as compared to the CB of Belize (developing country) for ease of reference 
and the TOR of governors for the CB of Belize as compared to the BoE to measure its 
‘true’ level of independence. 
Table 1 below illustrates the BoE’s independence based on the four (4) legal 
indicators of the CWN index.  It depicts the BoE’s narrow mandate of price stability 
as compared to the CB of Belize wider mandate that is subject to government’s 
monitoring and intervention.  In addition, the BoE has the ultimate power to control 
monetary policy whereas the CB of Belize is responsible for formulating and 
implementing monetary policy within the context of the economic activity of the 
government. The appointment of the governor of the BoE has to be approved by Her 
Majesty the Queen whereas in Belize, the appointment has to be approved by the PM.  
The term of office of the governor of the BoE is for one fixed term of eight (8) years 
as compared to the CB of Belize five (5) year term and is also subject to re-
appointment.  However the BoE governor is subject to dismissal330 just like governors 
in other developed countries like the US331 as well as developing countries specific to 
this research but on a much narrower dimension.  As mentioned, a country’s level of 
development might also play a major role regarding financing to the government.332 A 
developed country such as the UK is evident in this since the BoE does not support 
financing to the government with no provisions in its legal charter relating to this.  In 
fact the government borrowing from the CB tend to be illegal under the Maastricht 
Treaty.333 On the other hand, in more than half of developing countries, it seems to be 
a common practice for CB to provide advances and sometimes loans to the 
government.334 During the period 2003 to 2004, GoB was heavily relying on CB’s 
financing for fiscal deficits averaging 7.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).335 
What did this lead to? Under the unrelenting pressure of servicing the external debt, 
the CB ended 2004 with reduced reserves and an external asset ratio of 32%, which 
was below the legal threshold of 40%.336 This led to the third major debt-refinancing 
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episode in the first quarter of 2005.337  
Table 1: Showing the BoE greater level of independence as compared to the CB of 
Belize based on the 4 legal indices of the CWN index 
CWN Legal Indicators BoE CB of Belize 
Primary Objective Price Stability338  
- Subject to economic 
growth and employment  
Monetary and Exchange Rate 
Stability, promote credit and 
exchange conditions339  
Extent of Monetary Policy 
Setting and Implementation  
Complete control over 
monetary policy340  
Formulating and implementing 
monetary policy but within the 
context of the economic activity of 
the government341 
Governance Structure: 
Appointment of Governor  
Term of Office 
Subject to Dismissal  
Chancellor of the 
Exchequer but with Her 
Majesty the Queen 
approval342  
1 Fix Term of 8 years343 
Subject to dismissal on 3 
grounds344  
- Governor General on the advice 
of the Prime Minister – 
Approval345  
- 5 years but subject to re-
appointment346 
- Subject to dismissal on 5 
grounds347  
Credit/Financing to 
Government  
Does not support  Supports advances and loans348  
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In countries where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in the political culture, 
there can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional arrangements and their 
practical impact.349  This is particularly the case for many developing countries350 like 
Belize. Governments do not respect the rule of law as much; hence legal 
independence does not measure a CBs ‘true’ independence.351  Respecting the CB’s 
statue is vital, but what happens if government can use its power to easily change the 
constitutional law to suit their needs? The more ‘rigid’ a constitution is said to be, the 
harder it will be to amend the constitutional text.352 Constitutional laws need to have 
more stringent amendment procedures to restrict government to use its authority353 or 
that the decisions cannot be reversed only in extreme cases.354 Without that immunity, 
it would be a mockery of CBI, for its decisions would stand only as long as they did 
not displease someone more powerful.355 With this in mind, what are the possibilities 
of making amendments in a developed country verses a developing country? In the 
US, the formal amendment requirements of Article V of the US constitution are said 
to make the US Constitution difficult to amend.356  In the US system of government, 
neither the president nor the Supreme Court can reverse a decision of the Federal 
Open Market Committee.357 Congress can, in principle, reverse such a decision, but 
only if it passes a law that the president will sign (or by overriding a presidential 
veto).358 This makes the FED’s decisions, for all practical purposes, immune from 
reversal; and, indeed, they never have been reversed.359 The Constitution of Belize 
however has been amended several times since it was enacted on Independence Day 
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1981.360 Amendments can be done more easily based on the recently amended Section 
69 Part VI passed through the Ninth Amendment (Powers and Procedures) that 
caused a lot of controversy.361 The number of amendments reached a record high 
during 2008 to 2012 under the first term of the UDP.362 But how was this even 
possible? Well the government at that time enjoyed a super majority in parliament 
allowing it to enact any amendment it wanted without the concurrence of the 
opposition PUP.363 This begs the question of whether the Belize National Assembly is 
supreme instead of the Constitution?  So would it be reasonable to conclude that CBI 
is greater in developed countries than developing countries simply as a result of these 
legal indices? No since legal independence is a reasonable proxy for actual 
independence provided there is sufficient respect for the rule of law in countries under 
consideration,364 like the UK as opposed to Belize. With this in mind, the focus is 
now on the TOR of governors. 
4.2.2 TOR of Governors  
 
CWN (1992) argued by stating “The legal status of a central bank is only one of 
several elements that determine its actual independence. Many central banks laws are 
highly incomplete and leave a lot of room of interpretation. As a result, factors such 
as tradition or the personalities of the governor and other high officials of the bank at 
least partially shape the actual level of CBI. Even when the law is quite explicit, 
reality may be very different”.365 For this reason, Cukierman and Webb (1995) have 
developed de facto indicators of CBI, more adequate than de jure indicators to study 
the CBI in developing and emerging countries.366 This is based on measuring the 
actual TOR, or TOR relative to the formally specified term length.367 High actual 
turnover is interpreted as indicating political interference in the conduct of monetary 
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policy;368 hence leading to a lower level of independence. 
Table 2 below shows the actual TOR of governors at the CB of Belize from its 
inception.  Note that the legislated term of office for each governor is not exceeding 5 
years but is subject to re-appointment.369 A total of five (5) governors with the 
exception of the current governor served less than the 5 years term in office. 
Strikingly, the governor from its inception Sir Edney Cain served only over a year, 
while the second governor Mr. Robert Swift served just a little over two (2) years.  
The third governor Mr. Alan Slusher had a longer term in office of almost completing 
the five year period but again only a short span of one (1) year for the forth (4) 
governor Sir Edney Cain who was also the first governor of the CB. The fifth 
governor Mr. Keith Arnold served the longest period of ten (10) years representing 
two consecutive terms in office but the governor after Mr. Jorge Meliton Auil again 
served for only one (1) year.  The two periods after, governors served a good length 
of time with Mr. Sydney Campbell serving his full length of tenure (five years) and 
Mr. Ysaguirre serving the second longest tenure in office of eight (8) years.  A total of 
nine (9) governors served over a period of thirty-five (35) years since the inception of 
the CB.  If compared to the BoE, where there is only five (5) governors serving over a 
longer period of time (forty five years) from 1973 up to 2017;370 taking into account 
that previously the term of office was a maximum of two (5 years) term however this 
was amended in 2012 to a single term of eight (8) years.371 What does this imply? 
Wouldn’t you assume that a greater level of TOR of governors from the CB of Belize 
(serving less than the five year term in office) especially over a shorter time span (ten 
years) than the BoE whose governors all served full term in office would indicate that 
there is government influence leading to a lower level of CBI in developing countries 
such as Belize as compared to a developed country like the UK? “This indicator is 
based on the presumption that, at least above some threshold, more rapid turnover of 
CB governors indicates a lower level of independence.  Indeed, more rapid turnover 
presumably creates dependence.  If the political authorities frequently take the 
opportunity to choose a new governor, they will at least have the opportunity to pick 
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369 Central Bank of Belize Act 1982, s (IV) (II) (2) 
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those who will do their will.  Frequent turnover may reflect the firing of those who 
choose to challenge the government.”372  This is quite evident in developing countries 
for instance in Barbados, Governor DeLisle Worrell’s February 24, 2017 dismissal 
came after weeks of tension between him, his board and the government; the matter of 
his advice to the MoF in relation to government spending and the need to repair the 
CB’s reserves seemed to have played a major role in his dismissal.373  The governor 
made a surprised announcement that the government needs to halt its practice of 
taking new issuances of money from the CB to pay its bills; hence some 
commentators strongly believe that his refusal to continue along that path was the root 
cause for his dismissal.374 
 
Table 2: Illustrating TOR of Governors at the CB of Belize  
GOVERNORS  TERM OF OFFICE  TIME SERVED  
1.) Sir Edney Cain Jan. 1982 to Oct. 1983 Over 1 year  
2.) Mr. Robert Swift  Nov. 1983 to Jan. 1986 Over 2 years  
3.) Mr. Alan Slusher  Feb. 1986 to Nov. 1990 Over 4 years  
4.) Sir Edney Cain Jan. 1991 to Dec. 1991 1 year 
5.) Mr. Keith Arnold  Jan. 1992 to Mar. 2002 Over 10 years  
6.) Mr. Jorge Meliton Auil Apr. 2002 to Sept. 2003 Over 1 year  
7.) Mr. Sydney Campbell Oct. 2003 to Sept. 2008 5 years  
8.) Mr. Glenford Ysaguirre Oct. 2008 to Sept. 2016 8 years  
9.) Mrs. Joy Grant  Oct. 2016 to present  11 months  
 
A report released by the research department of the CB of Belize in 2009, indicated 
that although the CB’s aim is for monetary and exchange rate stability, there are 
substantial obstacles in the way of its success, principal among which is the 
                                                
372 Maxwell Fry, ‘Assessing Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: Do 
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subservience of monetary policy to the fiscal stance.375 In 1998 to 2003, fiscal 
dominance and lack of CB independence paved the way for the implementation of 
policies that contributed to large balance of payments deficits, the intensification of 
pressures on the fixed exchange rate, a burgeoning external debt and economic 
instability.376 With the economy having been brought to the brink of a very disorderly 
adjustment, the need for greater CB independence in the implementation of monetary 
policy was clearly underscored.377 The CB therefore began to explore its options for 
achieving a decoupling from its role as automatic financier of fiscal deficits as well as 
a more market approach to dealing with liquidity build-up in the banking system.378 Is 
there a chance for greater CBI in developing countries like Belize? The answer seems 
pretty vague especially since government still intervenes even when the economy 
seems to be in economic turmoil.  
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CONCLUSION 
The idea of CBI has been at the forefront of financial market liberalization since the 
late 1980s and is still quite a relevant topic of discussion.379  Many countries have 
granted their CBs more independence in the pursuit of attaining price stability.380  The 
general motive for granting such independence is based on the conclusion that CBI 
would lead to a lowering of inflation rates381 since central bankers adapt a more 
rational decision- making and ability to commit to long-term objectives as compared 
to politicians who may have several short-run objectives including that of being re-
elected; hence experience an inflationary bias.382   
Despite the trend of granting greater independence to CBs, the paper’s focus was 
aimed at illustrating how the level of independence vary from a developed to a 
developing country.  Both theoretical and empirical evidence was presented based on 
the CWN index and the TOR of CB’s governors.  Evidence has shown a greater level 
of legal independence in developed countries where the rule of law upholds and is 
more difficult to make amendments to the constitution.  On the other hand, CBs in 
developing countries depicts a lower level of independence as a result of significant 
government influence as shown using the legal indicators of the CWN and utilizing 
the TOR of CBs governors that gives a more practical measure of independence.    
Given the circumstance, it is questionable whether there is hope for achieving a 
greater level of CBI in developing Caribbean countries for overall economic stability.  
The answer lies in the hands of the government since they are ultimately responsible 
for the current state of the economy. 
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